Abstract. The stream cipher TPypy has been designed by Biham and Seberry in January 2007 as the strongest member of the Py-family ciphers, after weaknesses in the other members Py, Pypy, Py6 were discovered. One main contribution of the paper is the detection of related-key weaknesses in the Py-family of ciphers including the strongest member TPypy. Under related keys, we show a distinguishing attack on TPypy with data complexity 2 192.3 which is lower than the previous best known attack on the cipher by a factor of 2 88 . It is shown that the above attack also works on the other members TPy, Pypy and Py. A second contribution of the paper is design and analysis of two fast ciphers RCR-64 and RCR-32 which are derived from the TPy and the TPypy respectively. The performances of the RCR-64 and the RCR-32 are 2.7 cycles/byte and 4.45 cycles/byte on Pentium III (note that the speeds of the ciphers Py, Pypy and RC4 are 2.8, 4.58 and 7.3 cycles/byte). Based on our security analysis, we conjecture that no attacks lower than brute force are possible on the RCR ciphers.
Introduction
Timeline -The Py-Family of Ciphers -April 2005, Design. The ciphers Py and Py6, designed by Biham and Seberry, were submitted to the ECRYPT project for analysis and evaluation in the category of software based stream ciphers [4] . The impressive speed The information in this document reflects only the authors' views, is provided as is and no guarantee or warranty is given that the information is fit for any particular purpose. The user thereof uses the information at its sole risk and liability.
of the cipher Py in software (about 2.5 times faster than the RC4) made it one of the fastest and most attractive contestants. data and comparable time each [22] . Moreover, they have modified TPy6 to design two new ciphers TPy6-A and TPy6-B which were claimed to be free from all attacks excluding brute force ones.
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Contribution of the paper. The list that orders the Py-family of ciphers in terms of increasing security is: Py6→Py→ Pypy → TPy6 → TPy → TPypy (the strongest). The ciphers are normally used with 32-byte keys and 16-byte initial values (or IV). However, the key size may vary from 1 to 256 bytes and the IV from 1 to 64 bytes. The ciphers were claimed by the designers to be free from related-key and distinguishing attacks [3, 4, 5] .
(i) Related-key Weaknesses. One major contribution of the paper is the discovery of related-key attacks due to weaknesses in the key scheduling algorithms of the Py-family of ciphers. The main idea behind a related-key attack is that, the attacker, who chooses a relation f between a pair of keys key 1 and key 2 (e.g., key 1 = f (key 2 )) rather than the actual values of the keys, is able to extract secret information from a cryptosystem using the relation f [2, 13] . Related-key weakness is a cause for concern in a protocol where key-integrity is not guaranteed or when the keys are generated manually rather than from a pseudorandom number generator [12] . Related-key weaknesses are not new in the literature.
The usefulness of such type of attacks was first outlined by Knudsen in [14, 15] ; since then a good deal of research has been spent on related-key weaknesses on block ciphers [2, 12, 13, 16] . The related-key weaknesses of a block cipher can be translated into attacking hash functions based on that particular block cipher and vice versa [9, 10, 17, 20, 26, 27] . On the other hand, discovery of related-key weaknesses of stream ciphers is not very common in the literature, mainly due to the heavy operations executed in one-time key-scheduling algorithms compared to the operations performed in iterative block ciphers. However, there is an example where related-key weaknesses of the stream cipher RC4 are used to break the WEP protocol with practical complexity [8] . Furthermore, there is a growing tendency by the designers nowadays to build hash functions from stream ciphers [6] instead of building them from block ciphers. In such attempts, related-key weaknesses of stream ciphers need to be addressed carefully.
In the paper, we show that, when used with the identical IVs of 16 bytes each, if two long keys key 1 
then the above relation, exploiting the weaknesses of the key setup algorithms of Py-family of ciphers (i.e., TPypy, TPy, Pypy, Py), propagates through the IV setup algorithms and finally induces biases in the outputs at the 1st and the 3rd rounds. Such related key pairs are used to build a distinguisher for each of the aforementioned ciphers with 2 193.7 output words and comparable time (note that, in total, there are 2 2048 such pairs, while our distinguisher needs any 2 193.7 randomly chosen pairs of keys). This result constitutes the best attack on the strongest member of the Py-family of ciphers TPypy; they are also shown to be effective on the other members TPy, Pypy and Py (see Table 1 ). These related-key attacks work with any IV-size ranging from 16 to 64 bytes. However, the attack complexities increase with shorter keys. Note that the usage of long keys in the Py-family of ciphers makes it very attractive to be used as fast hash functions (e.g., by replacing of the key with the message). In such cases, these related-key weaknesses can turn out to be serious impediments.
(ii) The Ciphers RCR-32 and RCR-64. Finally, we make simple modifications to the ciphers TPypy and TPy to build two new ciphers RCR-32 and RCR-64 respectively. In the modified designs, the key scheduling algorithms of RCR-32 and RCR-64 are identical with those of the TPypy and the TPy. The changes are made only to the round functions where variable rotations are replaced with constant rotations. Our extensive analyses show that the modifications not only free the Py-family ciphers from all the existing attacks, it also improves on the performance of the ciphers without exposing them to new weaknesses (see Sect. 5 for an elaborate security analysis). As a result, the cipher RCR-64 goes on to become one of the the fastest stream ciphers published in the literature (approximately 2.7 cycles per byte on Pentium III). The names are chosen to reflect the functionalities involved in the ciphers. For example, RCR-64 denotes Rolling, Constant Rotation and 64 bits output/round.
Description of the Stream Ciphers TPypy, TPy, Pypy and Py
Each of the Py-family of ciphers is composed of three parts: (1) a key setup algorithm, (2) an IV setup algorithm and (3) a round function or pseudorandom bit generation algorithm (PRBG). The first two parts are used for the initial onetime mixing of the secret key and the IV. These parts generate a pseudorandom internal state composed of (1) a permutation P of 256 elements, (2) a 32-bit array Y of 260 elements and (3) a 32-bit variable s. The key/IV setup uses two intermediate variables:
(1) a fixed permutation of 256 elements denoted by internal permutation and (2) a variable EIV whose size is equal to that of the IV. The round function, which is executed iteratively, is used to update the internal state (i.e., P , Y and s) and to generate pseudorandom output bits. The key setup algorithms of the TPypy, the TPy, the Pypy and the Py are identical. Notation for different parts of the four ciphers is provided in Table 2 . Due to space constraints, the KS, the IV S 1 , the IV S 2 , the RF 1 and the RF 2 , as mentioned in Table 2 , are described in the full version of the paper [24] . The details of the algorithms can also be found in [3, 4, 5] . IV S1 IV S1 IV S2 IV S2 Round Function RF1 RF2 RF1 RF2
Notation and Convention
The notation and the convention followed in the paper are described below.
-The pseudorandom bit generation algorithm of a stream cipher is denoted by PRBG. -The outputs generated when key 1 and key 2 are used are denoted by O and Z respectively.
) denotes the bth bit (b = 0 is the least significant bit or lsb) of the second output word generated at round a when key 1 (or key 2 ) is used. We do not use the first output word anywhere in our analysis.
and s a 1 are the inputs to the PRBG at round a when key 1 is used. It is easy to see that when this convention is followed the O a takes a simple form:
respectively. -The operators '+' and '−' denote addition modulo 2 32 and subtraction modulo 2 32 respectively, except when used with expressions which relate two elements of array P . In this case they denote addition and subtraction over Z. -The symbol '⊕' denotes bitwise exclusive-or, ∩ denotes set intersection and ∪ denotes set union.
Related-Key Weaknesses in the Py-Family of Ciphers
We first choose two keys, key 1 
Now we observe that the above relation between the keys can be traced through various parts of the Py-family of ciphers.
Propagation of the Weaknesses Through the Key Setup Algorithm
For key 1 and key 2 , the values of the variable s through Algorithm A are tabulated in Table 3 . The Algorithm A is a part of the key setup algorithm KS (described in the full version of the paper [24] ). If x is a 32-bit variable, let B(x) denote the least significant byte of x. In Table 3 , For event D 1 to occur, δ 1 should be an 8-bit integer. Running simulation, it is determined that
Hence, another part of the key setup. Hence,
If s 
Propagation of the Weaknesses Through the IV Setup
Given that the D 3 ∩ D 2 ∩ D 1 occurs, i.e., s , we now trace the variables s, Y , P and EIV through the first part of the IV setup. We now consider Algorithm D which is a part of the IV setup. It is to be noted that s, Y (obtained after the key setup) and the iv are the basic elements used in the IV setup to define the P and the EIV and to update the s and the Y . We now model our attack in such a way that the same IV is used with both the keys. Prior to the execution of Algorithm D, the only elements of array Y which are used in the first part of the IV setup are
is not used, it follows that P 1 (that is, P when key 1 is used) and P 2 (that is, P when key 2 is used) are identical. In Algorithm D as well, Y [13] is not used to update the s or define the EIV when the IV is of the recommended size of 16 bytes. For longer IVs, we can induce the first difference in the keys (that is, where the least significant bits alone differ) according to the size of the IV. An example is provided in the full version [24] . It is to be noted that, if the IV-size is N bytes, the first difference in the keys should be induced nowhere: neither (1) in the first N − 1 bytes (i.e., key bytes 0 to N − 1), nor (2) in the last N − 3 bytes (i.e., key bytes 260 − N to 256). Otherwise, it is immaterial as to where the first difference is set (i.e., anywhere We now consider Algorithm E. Again, Y [13] is not used to update the s or the EIV (for both IV S 1 and IV S 2 ). Hence, at the end of Algorithm E, we have
(where i = 13). With this result, we now proceed to the second part of the IV setup.
In the second part of the IV setup (that is, for IV S 2 ), when i = 16 (i = 17 for IV S 1 ), the s generated using key 1 and key 2 are different due to the difference in Y [13] . This causes the EIV s to be different in the following round and hence P 1 = P 2 . In the subsequent rounds, the mixing becomes more random with the result that at the end of 260 rounds, we have 
Propagation of the Weaknesses Through the Round Function
Here, we consider only the round function RF 1 (see the full version [24] ). The formulas for the lsb of the outputs generated at rounds 1 and 3 when key 1 (the output words are denoted by O) and key 2 (the output words are denoted by Z) are used are given below.
Let Table 5 gives the conditions on the elements of P 1 and P 2 which when simultaneously satisfied gives C 1 ⊕C 2 ⊕C 3 ⊕C 4 = 0. The corresponding probabilities are also given. From Table 5 , it follows that events G 2 , G 3 and G 4 can be ignored when compared to G 1 . We now state the following theorem. 
Therefore, (13) becomes 
Now, when event E 2 (that is, P 
This completes the proof.
. The four events E 1 , E 2 , E 3 and E 4 are assumed to be independent to facilitate calculation of bias. The actual value without independence assumption is in fact more, making the attack marginally stronger. Hence, 
From the analysis in Sect. 4.1 and 4.2, when
Therefore, from equations (8), (9) , (10) and (11), we observe that
holds when the following events simultaneously occur.
In the following section, we calculate the probability that (18) is satisfied.
The Distinguisher
Let L denote the event (∩
. From (7), (17) and 
To compute the number of samples required to establish an optimal distinguisher with advantage greater than 0.5, we use the following equation:
from [1, 18] . Here, p = 2 −97. 4 . Therefore, the number of samples is 2 193.7 .
Attacks with Shorter Keys
The related-key attacks described in the previous sections can be applied with shorter keys also. However, the data complexity of the distinguisher increases exponentially as key size decreases. For example, when the key size is 128 bytes, the distinguisher works with 2 229.7 data and comparable time. For 64-byte key size, the data complexity of the distinguisher is 2 247.7 .
New Stream Ciphers -RCR-32 and RCR-64
As mentioned in Sect. 1, in the last couple of years, the Py-family of ciphers have come under several cryptanalytic attacks. In spite of the weaknesses, the ciphers retain some attractive features such as modification of the internal states with clever use of rolling arrays and fast mixing of several arithmetic operations. This motivates us to explore the possibility of designing new ciphers that retain all the good properties of the Py-family and yet are secure against all the existing and new attacks. In this section, we propose two new ciphers, RCR-32 (Rolling, C onstant Rotation, 32 -bit output per round) and RCR-64 derived from TPypy and Tpy, which are shown to be secure against all the existing attacks on the TPypy and TPy. The speeds of execution of the RCR-64 and the RCR-32 in software are 2.7 cycles and 4.45 cycles per byte which are better than the performances of the TPy (2.8 cycles/byte) and the TPypy (4.58 cycles/byte) respectively.
The key/IV setup algorithms of the RCR-64 and the RCR-32 are identical with those of the TPy and the TPypy. The PRBGs of the RCR-64 and the RCR-32 are also very similar to those of the TPy and the TPypy. The only changes in the PRBGs are that: the variable rotation of the quantity s is replaced by a constant rotation of 19. Single round of RCR-32 and RCR-64 are shown in Algorithm 1.
Security Analysis
Due to restrictions on the page limit, the security analysis has been provided in the full version of the paper [24] . 
Future Work and Conclusion
In this paper, for the first time, we detect weaknesses in the key scheduling algorithms of several members of the Py-family. Precisely, we build distinguishing attacks with data complexities 2 193 each. Furthermore, we modify the ciphers TPypy and TPy to generate two fast ciphers, namely RCR-32 and RCR-64, in an attempt to rule out all the attacks against the Py-family of ciphers. We conjecture that attacks lower than brute force are not possible on RCR ciphers.
Our present work leaves room for interesting future work. The usage of long keys and IVs (e.g., possibility of 256-byte keys and 64-byte IVs) in RCR ciphers makes them good candidates to be used as hash functions. One can also try to combine a MAC and an encryption algorithm in a single primitive using RCR ciphers. It seems worthwhile to address these issues in future.
